Blog:
The Routing Protocol: voting, proof-of-balance, and slashing
In the introduction to the Routing Protocol article, we discussed the fundamental premise of the new Routing Protocol (RP). It is a layer that sits on top of HUMAN Protocol. If the core Protocol is the layer that executes the interactions of third parties, the RP can be thought of as the layer that coordinates these agents. It simplifies optimal execution, decentralizes upgrades, and provides agent reputation on the network.
The core HUMAN Protocol is responsible for execution. By separating the Routing Protocol from the execution layer – and by bringing governance to the Routing Protocol – the stability of the overall network is enhanced. If the Routing Protocol determines a change in fees/pricing, the core HUMAN Protocol can simply be tasked with executing the new details, without getting caught in matters of arbitration.
The Routing Protocol incentivizes contributions to the network by the community. One way it accomplishes this is to provide the framework to make these incentives possible through, for example, staking, slashing, and reward mechanisms.
The RP will also provide a blueprint to coordinate third party agents who contribute to the Protocol. Through the RP, businesses and tool vendors (Recording and Reputation Oracles, for example) can commit HMT to access the network.
This operates on a Proof of Balance model. Someone who wishes to participate in the network must put up a sum of HMT, much like a security deposit, to incentivize good behavior. The balance can be slashed if the user behaves poorly (see slashing below). It also plays an important role in determining operator priority in receiving work.
Separately, there is governance staking, whereby any user or network operator can stake HMT in return for vHMT, a token used for governance voting. This incentivizes active participation in the network by the community.
Altogether, staked tokens might lower operator fees, or lower collateral conversion costs. A discount mechanism could be introduced to reduce fees if paid in HMT, instead of other collateral.
Lock-ups from staking also protect against flash loan governance attacks (both minimum lock-up time and unstaking fees can deter this behavior).
This proposal focuses on alternate conviction voting, whereby voting power increases with each vote, along with the voter’s reputation (i.e. voting power will increase if, for example, you refer valuable projects, solve tasks, or contribute to overall development). This model will utilize HUMAN Protocol Reputation Oracles to adjust voting power. Such a system provides strong incentives to contribute to the HUMAN project.
A new article will be released on the voting details soon!
This is a question of what is made possible by the Routing Protocol. DeFi applications, such as Hummingbot (see our article on their work), could use the Routing Protocol to offer mechanisms to incentivize network contribution.
To discourage bad behavior within the network, slashing will be introduced. For example, if a user attempts to tamper with voting, or refuses to pay Workers in a workpool, their stake can be slashed.
In the case of operator inactivity, payouts from the pool will be frozen for a certain amount of time, acting as a trial warning.
Check out the new Routing Protocol webpage! Also, stay tuned – we will release a new article on staking, and one on voting, soon.
For the latest updates on HUMAN Protocol, follow us on Twitter or join our Discord. Alternatively, to enquire about integrations, usage, or to learn more about HUMAN Protocol, get in contact with the HUMAN team.
Legal Disclaimer
The HUMAN Protocol Foundation makes no representation, warranty, or undertaking, express or implied, as to the accuracy, reliability, completeness, or reasonableness of the information contained here. Any assumptions, opinions, and estimations expressed constitute the HUMAN Protocol Foundation’s judgment as of the time of publishing and are subject to change without notice. Any projection contained within the information presented here is based on a number of assumptions, and there can be no guarantee that any projected outcomes will be achieved.
